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Unlikely to Succeed:  How the Second Circuit’s Adherence 
to the Serious Questions Standard for the Granting of 
Preliminary Injunctions Contradicts Supreme Court 
Precedent and Turns an Extraordinary Remedy into an 
Ordinary One  
I. Introduction 
In March 2010, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit handed 
down its decision in Citigroup Global Markets v. VCG Special 
Opportunities Master Fund Limited causing at least one lawyer to note that 
“[t]he Second Circuit has now put itself on a collision course with the 
Supreme Court. . . .”1  The subject matter of this potential collision course 
is the appropriate standard for the issuance of preliminary injunctions in 
federal courts.2  More specifically, it concerns the Second Circuit’s 
continued use of the serious questions alternative as a substitution for the 
requirement that a party seeking a preliminary injunction demonstrate a 
likelihood of success on the merits despite recent Supreme Court precedent 
that may be read to prohibit that alternative.3  The ramifications of this 
potential jurisprudential conflict affect more than just the Second Circuit.  
Other circuits, including the Ninth and Tenth Circuits, also allow a serious 
questions alternative to substitute for the likelihood of success 
requirement.4  Therefore, the fate of these circuits’ preliminary injunction 
standard could very well be entwined with Citigroup’s fate. 
Not only does Citigroup raise the issue of a possible deviation from 
Supreme Court precedent, it speaks to the very nature of injunctive relief.  
A preliminary injunction “is an exceptionally potent and far-reaching 
remedy, the grant or denial of which often leads to a cascade of serious 
consequences.”5  As such, a preliminary injunction has long been regarded 
as an extraordinary remedy.6  Unquestionably, the injunction serves an 
                                                                                                                 
 1. Tom P. Taylor, Civil Procedure – Injunctions: ‘Serious Questions’ Standard Alive 
and Well For Preliminary Injunctions in the Second Circuit, 78 U.S.L.W. 1570 (2010). 
 2. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 
598 F.3d 30, 32 (2d Cir. 2010).  
 3. See id.  
 4. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, No. 09-35756, 2011 WL 208360, at 
*4 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2011); Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Int’l Registration Plan 
Inc., 455 F.3d 1107, 1112-13 (10th Cir. 2006). 
 5. KIRSTIN STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., INJUNCTIVE RELIEF:  TEMPORARY RESTRAINING 
ORDERS AND PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS 2 (2009). 
 6. Id. at 3. 
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important role in our judicial system.  It has been used, after all, to 
implement noble and necessary measures such as desegregating schools and 
preventing potentially unconstitutional legislation from taking effect until 
its constitutionality could be determined.7  Preliminary injunctions, 
however, threaten the liberty of those defending against such relief.8  This 
is, in part, because the risk of error is high in awarding a preliminary 
injunction due to the fact that it is awarded before a full trial on the merits is 
conducted.9  The requirements that must be met in order to enjoin another 
party from commencing a specific action serve as a vital protection against 
the potential error of issuing such an order prior to all the facts being 
established.10  Therefore, any case concerning what requirements are 
appropriate must be carefully analyzed so as not to turn an extraordinary 
and already risky remedy into an ordinary and potentially more dangerous 
one. 
In Citigroup, the Second Circuit defended its continued practice of 
allowing the serious questions standard to serve as an alternative to the 
requirement that a party seeking a preliminary injunction demonstrate that 
the party’s claim is likely to succeed on the merits.11  This note discusses 
and analyzes the logic, accuracy, and possible implications of the Citigroup 
decision.  Part II discusses the relevant law before Citigroup was decided 
including:  (1) a brief history of equitable remedies such as preliminary 
injunctions; (2) the relevant Supreme Court discussions of the standard for 
preliminary injunctions; (3) the federal circuit courts’ applications of the 
standard for preliminary injunctions; and (4) one of the most recent 
Supreme Court decisions, Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 
affecting the standard for granting a preliminary injunction in federal court.  
Part III provides an overview of Citigroup including the facts of the case 
and the Second Circuit’s reasons for upholding the serious questions 
alternative in the face of recent Supreme Court decisions.  Part IV will 
elucidate major flaws of Citigroup:  (1) Citigroup disregards the plain 
language of Winter; (2) Citigroup disregards the reasoning of Winter; and 
                                                                                                                 
 7. See id. at 2. 
 8. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES:  CASES AND MATERIALS 
337 (1985). 
 9. See DAN B. DOBBS, LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES—EQUITY—RESTITUTION 253 (2d 
ed. 1993). 
 10. See Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 345-46 
(4th Cir. 2009), partially vacated on other grounds, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 11. See Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 
598 F.3d 30, 34-38 (2d Cir. 2010).  
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(3) the elimination of the requirement that a movant demonstrate a 
likelihood of success on the merits before being granted a preliminary 
injunction significantly weakens a fundamental judicial safeguard for 
parties who are under threat of being erroneously forced to act or to refrain 
from acting, upon the issuance of a preliminary injunction. Finally, part V 
briefly concludes that the only way Citigroup can be allowed to stand is if 
Supreme Court precedent is disregarded. 
II. Law Before the Case 
A. Historical Perspective 
Equitable remedies, such as preliminary injunctions, have historically 
been deemed harsh, and as such are considered extraordinary.12  In the 
words of one court, “[r]elief by way of injunction . . . is a harsh remedy that 
is used only in special circumstances.”13  Equitable remedies are considered 
harsh because, unlike remedies at law, an equitable order is an order against 
the person.14  This means that, by being allowed to administer equitable 
relief, a judge has the power to “command[] conduct of some specified sort, 
and subject[] the defendant to a punishment if he [does] not obey.”15  
Equitable relief is harsh not only because it forces a defendant either to act 
or to refrain from acting,16 but also because the risk of error is high because 
the defendant has not yet been afforded a full hearing on the merits.17   
The classification of a preliminary injunction as an extraordinary 
measure traces back to the reservations the founding fathers had about the 
English Court of Chancery.18  Originally in England, only one court system 
heard cases and handed down decisions in the name of justice.19  In this 
system, a person desiring judicial relief commenced an action by 
petitioning for a “writ.”20  If a writ were granted it meant that the common 
                                                                                                                 
 12. See STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 3-4. 
 13. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Parmer, 496 S.W.2d 241, 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1973). 
 14. See DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIES:  DAMAGES—EQUITY—
RESTITUTION 25 (1973). 
 15. Id. 
 16. See RUSSELL WEAVER ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF REMEDIES LAW 5 (2007). 
 17. See DOBBS, supra note 9, at 253 (recognizing that it is “[a] possibility that 
preliminary relief will prove to be erroneous when a full trial on the merits is held”). 
 18. See STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 4-11. 
 19. See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 16, at 5. 
 20. ROBERT S. THOMPSON & JOHN A. SEBERT JR., REMEDIES: DAMAGES, EQUITY AND 
RESTITUTION 220 (2d ed. 1989). 
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law court was directed “to hear and adjudicate the case.”21  The type of writ 
that a litigant needed depended on the type of action. Indeed, “[t]here was a 
different form of writ for each form of action.”22  Unless “the facts [of the 
particular case] fell within the scope of an existing writ,” a litigant did not 
have a cause of action.23  As a result, some litigants, despite having suffered 
injustices, were left without remedy simply because their facts did not fall 
in line with any existing writs.24  The English common law system thus 
became a system that was “hidebound by formality and restrictions.”25   
In response to this formulaic and rigid system, litigants began by-passing 
common law courts and petitioning the King himself to provide relief for 
claims that fell outside of the writ system.26  Originally the King answered 
all petitions, but as the number of petitions grew, the King, like most 
executives, chose to delegate.27  The King appointed Chancellors to resolve 
the petitions.28  As a result, the late 15th century saw the creation of the 
Court of Chancery.29  Not bound by the writ system of remedies, the 
Chancellors had the ability to issue equitable relief. Equitable relief requires 
a party to “engage, or refrain from engaging, in specific acts.”30  Among 
equitable powers, the Chancellors were vested with the right to “exercise[] 
the King’s arbitrary power to ‘do justice’ in certain cases, including the 
power to grant injunctive relief.”31  The men selected to serve as 
Chancellors “were initially selected primarily from the high ranking 
clergy.”32  Chancellors “enjoyed a wide discretion to grant injunctive 
relief.”33  In line with their ecclesiastical origin, the Chancellors often 
turned to conscience and morality when determining whether to issue an 
injunction and other equitable relief.34  This led to the appearance that 
                                                                                                                 
 21. Id. 
 22. R.J. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 20-21 (6th ed. 1985). 
 23. Id. 
 24. See id. at 43-44. 
 25. Id. at 42. 
 26. See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 16, at 5; WALKER, supra note 22, at 44. 
 27. See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 16, at 5; WALKER, supra note 22, at 44. 
 28. See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 16, at 5 (explaining that originally a plaintiff could 
bypass the King’s Court and petition the King himself but due to the volume of these 
petitions, the King delegated judgment on these petitions to his Chancellor). 
 29. See WALKER, supra note 22, at 44. 
 30. See WEAVER ET AL., supra note 16, at 7. 
 31. STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 4-11. 
 32. THOMPSON & SEBERT JR., supra note 20, at 220; see WALKER, supra note 22, at 44. 
 33. See STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 3-4. 
 34. See id. at 3; THOMPSON & SEBERT JR., supra note 20, at 222 (stating that “true to their 
ecclesiastical origin, chancery courts continued to act ‘in equity as a court of conscience’”). 
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decisions handed down by the Court of Chancery were based on moral 
whims of the conscience instead of legal principles.35   
The wide discretion afforded to Chancellors, combined with an absence 
of concrete legal principles, resulted in many decisions of the Court of 
Chancery being criticized as improper and unnecessarily arbitrary.36  The 
sometimes harsh remedies of equity were imposed with little regard to 
consistency as well as little to no mechanisms for keeping in check the 
personal agendas of the Chancellors.  Unregulated Chancellor discretion 
motivated Thomas Jefferson’s Anti-Federalists to oppose the idea of 
allowing federal judges to distribute equitable relief in the newly formed 
United States.37  The Anti-Federalists’ main concern was that allowing 
federal courts to have such power “would invest judges with arbitrary 
Chancellor-like power ‘to decide as their conscience, their opinions, their 
caprice, or their politics might dictate.’”38  Alexander Hamilton attempted 
to assuage Anti-Federalists’ concerns, assuring that “the great and primary 
use of a court of equity [will be] to give relief in extraordinary cases.”39  In 
line with Hamilton’s views, United States federal courts have traditionally 
held that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary remedy and as such 
should not be imposed absent special circumstances.40 
B. The Supreme Court’s Rulings on Preliminary Injunction Before Winter 
Due to the belief that preliminary injunctions are “extraordinary” and 
should not be used except in special circumstances, the Supreme Court has 
consistently held there is no absolute right to a preliminary injunction in 
any situation.41  Since there is no right to receive injunctive relief, whether 
such relief is awarded is generally left up to the discretion of the district 
court.42  Although a district court has discretion to determine whether or not 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 3-4. 
 36. See id. at 3. 
 37. See id. at 3-4. 
 38. Id. at 4 (quoting Fed. Farmer No. 15, Jan. 18, 1788, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-
FEDERALIST 322-23 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1981)).   
 39. THE FEDERALIST No. 83, at 569 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).  
 40. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 689-90 (2008); Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 
968, 972 (1997).   
 41. See Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944); Weinberger v. Romero-
Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 312 (1982) (stating that injunctive relief is not a matter of right even 
in cases where the movant may eventually suffer irreparable harm). 
 42. See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 664 (2004) (stating that “[the Supreme] 
Court, like other appellate courts, has always applied the abuse of discretion standard on 
review of a preliminary injunction.”); Yakus, 321 U.S. at 440. 
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to award a preliminary injunction, the Supreme Court issued guidelines that 
a court must consider when determining whether such relief is 
appropriate.43  Such guidelines make sense given that the founders did not 
fear all discretion, just unchecked, arbitrary discretion like that of the 
Chancellors in England.  
 In Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., the Supreme Court emphasized two 
traditional requirements a plaintiff must meet in order to be awarded a 
preliminary injunction:44  the plaintiff must “show that in the absence of 
[the preliminary injunction’s] issuance he will suffer irreparable harm and 
that he is likely to prevail on the merits.”45  The Doran Court noted that 
“the standard to be applied by the district court in deciding whether a 
plaintiff is entitled to a preliminary injunction is stringent.”46  In line with 
this stringency, the Supreme Court continues to require a party to 
demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits of a case in order to be 
awarded a preliminary injunction.47 
In addition to the two requirements laid out in Doran, the Supreme Court 
also instructed courts to “balance[] the conveniences of the parties and 
possible injuries to them according as they may be affected by the granting 
or withholding of the injunction.”48  This factor is often referred to as 
“balancing the equities”49 or “balancing the hardships.”50  Essentially, it 
requires a court to weigh the burdens that will be placed on the defendant if 
the injunction is issued against the burdens on the plaintiff if relief is 
denied.51  Finally, the Supreme Court has instructed courts to take into 
consideration the effect that the issuance or denial of a preliminary 
injunction would have on public interests.52   
As a result, even though Doran states only two factors in the 
“traditional” test for preliminary injunction, federal courts have developed a 
                                                                                                                 
 43. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975).   
 44. Id. at 932. 
 45. Id. at 931. 
 46. Id. (emphasis added). 
 47. See Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428 
(2006); Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 666 (2004); Grupo Mexican de Desarrollo v. 
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 340 (1999). 
 48. Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 440 (1944); see also Amoco Prod. Co. v. 
Village of Banbell, Alaska, 480 U.S. 531, 542 (1987). 
 49. RICHARD L. HASEN, REMEDIES: EXAMPLES AND EXPLANATIONS 193 (2d ed. 2010). 
 50. WEAVER ET AL., supra note 16, at 12.   
 51. See Heritage of America, LLC v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 66, 78-79 (Fed. Cl. 
2007). 
 52. Amoco Prod. Co., 480 U.S. at 542.   
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss3/5
2012] NOTES 443 
 
 
four-part traditional test for determining whether a court should grant a 
motion for preliminary injunction.53  The four factors can be stated as such:  
“(1) the significance of the threat of irreparable harm to plaintiff if the 
injunction is not granted; (2) the state of the balance between this harm and 
the injury that granting the injunction would inflict on defendant; (3) the 
probability that plaintiff will succeed on the merits; and (4) the public 
interest.”54 
C. Circuit Court Confusion 
Even though the Supreme Court has set forth the factors that should be 
considered when determining whether preliminary injunctive relief is 
appropriate, there has been little agreement among the federal circuit courts 
on exactly how to articulate the appropriate factors or how those factors 
should be applied.55  For instance, some courts rely on a two-part test, some 
a three-part test, and others the traditional four-part test.56  Whether factors 
should be articulated in a four part, three part, or two part test is beyond the 
scope of this note.  For purposes of this note, the traditional four part test 
and the serious questions alternative to the likelihood of success 
requirement are relevant.  Federal circuits also differ widely on how the 
factors should be applied.57  Significant approaches include the sliding scale 
test, the serious questions version of the sliding scale, and the threshold test. 
1. Sliding Scale Approach 
The “sliding scale approach” is a common method of applying Doran 
factors.58  The United States Court of Federal Claims has articulately and 
succinctly explained the sliding scale approach.59  In applying the four 
traditional factors, the court, in Eskridge Research Corp. v. United States, 
stated, “[n]o single factor is determinative and the ‘weakness of the 
showing regarding one factor may be overborne by the strength of the 
others.’”60  The D.C. Court of Appeals described this approach similarly: 
“[the traditional four factors] interrelate on a sliding scale and must be 
                                                                                                                 
 53. See 11A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER, & MARY KAY KANE, 
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2948 (2d ed. 1995). 
 54. Id. 
 55. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, THE DEATH OF THE IRREPARABLE INJURY RULE 118 (1991). 
 56. See STOLL-DEBELL ET AL., supra note 5, at 19-20. 
 57. See id. at 19-20. 
 58. LAYCOCK, supra note 55, at 118. 
 59. See Eskridge Research Corp. v. United States, 92 Fed. Cl. 88, 96 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 60. Id. at 96 (quoting FMC Corp. v. United States, 3 F.3d 424, 427 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).   
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balanced against each other.”61  The court clarified, “[i]f the arguments for 
one factor are particularly strong, an injunction may issue even if the 
arguments in other areas are weak.”62   
Some courts couch this approach as a “balancing” test but in essence the 
balancing involves the same analysis as applying the “sliding scale.”63  In a 
circuit that adopts this approach, the movant need not fully establish that 
each individual factor weighs in his favor, but instead must show that the 
factors as a whole weigh in his favor.64  For example, a party may not be 
able to establish that the irreparable harm that it will suffer absent 
injunction will outweigh the harm to the other party if the injunction is 
granted.  But that party can still obtain an injunction so long as the party 
makes a strong showing of likelihood of success on the merits.65  Likewise, 
a strong showing of irreparable harm may allow an injunction to be granted 
despite a weak showing of likelihood of success.66  This approach eases the 
plaintiff’s burden compared to an approach that requires a plaintiff to prove 
that each factor is in his favor. 
2. Serious Questions Test:  Sliding Scale Redux 
As long as there are serious questions going to the merits of the case, 
some circuits allow the grant of a preliminary injunction without the 
movant showing a likelihood of success on the merits.67  Although this 
approach is couched as the “serious questions standard,” in application it 
                                                                                                                 
 61. Serono Labs., Inc. v. Shalala, 158 F.3d 1313, 1317-18 (D.C. Cir. 1998). 
 62. Id.  (quoting CityFed Fn. Corp. v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 58 F.3d 738, 746 
(D.C. Cir. 1995).  
 63. See In re Delorean, 755 F.2d 1223, 1229 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that the factors 
were “not prerequisites that must be met” but rather were to be balanced against one another 
in such a way that one factor may be weak so long as the other factors are strong enough in 
plaintiff’s favor that they balance out the weak factor); Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C.L. Sys., 
Inc., 640 F.2d 109, 113 (8th Cir. 1981) (stating that “no single factor is determinative, and 
thus if the showing of irreparable harm is weak, an injunction can be granted so long as the 
showing of likelihood of success is strong.”). 
 64. See Hoosier Energy Rural Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. John Hancock Life Ins. Co., 582 
F.3d 721, 725 (7th Cir. 2009). 
 65. See Dataphase Sys. Inc., 640 F.2d at 113. 
 66. See Serono Labs., 158 F.3d at 1318 (stating that an injunction may be granted if the 
arguments for one factor are strong and the arguments for another are weak). 
 67. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, No. 09-35756, 2011 WL 208360, at 
*4 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2011); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities 
Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010); Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n v. 
Int’l Registration Plan Inc., 455 F.3d 1107, 1113 (10th Cir. 2006). 
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proves simply to be a version of the sliding scale approach.68  More 
specifically, it functions as a qualified sliding scale.69  A full-fledged sliding 
scale approach generally allows an injunction to issue when any factor is 
weak as long as other factors are strong enough to balance out the weak 
factor.70  The serious questions standard, on the other hand, deals 
specifically with the weakness of the likelihood of success on the merits.71  
For instance, in Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission v. 
International Registration Plan Inc., the Tenth Circuit stated that a movant 
must establish all four of the traditional factors in order to be awarded a 
preliminary injunction.72  This test, however, becomes modified if the 
movant shows that the likelihood of irreparable harm, the balance of the 
equities, and the public interest factors “tip strongly in his favor.”73  This 
modified test allows the movant to be awarded an injunction merely by 
showing the existence of “serious, substantial, difficult, and doubtful” 
questions as to the merits of the case in lieu of demonstrating a likelihood 
of success on the merits.74   
The Second Circuit, in cases like Citigroup, allows the serious questions 
standard wholly to substitute for a movant showing a likelihood of success 
on the merits.75  Importantly, however, the Second Circuit’s serious 
questions alternative proves to be less stringent than the standard applied by 
the Tenth Circuit.76  In Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc., the 
Second Circuit stated that a plaintiff can obtain a preliminary injunction by 
showing he will suffer irreparable harm absent the injunction.  Moreover, 
the plaintiff must show: “(1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) [a] 
sufficiently serious question going to the merits to make them a fair ground 
for litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party 
requesting the preliminary relief.”77  In contrast, the Tenth Circuit’s 
language in Oklahoma ex rel. Oklahoma Tax Commission only allows the 
                                                                                                                 
 68. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies, 2011 WL 208360, at *4. 
 69. Id. 
 70. See Serono Labs. Inc., 158 F.3d at 1317-18; Dataphase Sys., Inc., 640 F.2d at 113.  
 71. See Oklahoma ex rel. Okla. Tax Comm’n, 455 F.3d at 1113. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. (quoting Davis v. Mineta, 302 F.3d 1104, 1111 (10th Cir. 2002). 
 74. Id. (quoting Davis, 302 F.3d at 1111). 
 75. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 
F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010); Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc, 596 F.2d 70, 72 
(2d Cir. 1979). 
 76. Compare Jackson Dairy, Inc., 596 F.2d at 72 with Oklahoma ex rel. Okla, Tax 
Comm’n, 455 F.3d at 1113. 
 77. Jackson Dairy, Inc., 596 F.2d at 72. 
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serious questions alternative if the movant can establish that all the other 
factors tip decidedly in his favor.78  Jackson Dairy, Inc., on the other hand, 
requires the movant to show only that the balance of hardships tips 
decidedly in his favor in order to reach the serious questions alternative.79   
3. Threshold Test 
Finally, some circuits require all four factors80 to be established, or at the 
very least the Doran traditional two factors,81 or treat one or more of the 
traditional requirements as thresholds that must be met before a court 
considers other requirements.82  For instance, the Eleventh Circuit stated 
that a movant should not be awarded a preliminary injunction unless all 
four prerequisites are “clearly established.”83  The Eleventh Circuit 
reasoned that the “grant[ing] of preliminary injunction ‘is the exception 
rather than the rule,’ and plaintiff must clearly carry the burden of 
persuasion.”84  Likewise, the Fifth Circuit held that prerequisites for 
preliminary injunctions must be clearly established by the plaintiff based on 
the fact that there is no right to a preliminary injunction and it is an 
exception to the rule rather than the rule itself.85  Other circuits apply this 
standard more narrowly and emphasize that one or more factors are the sine 
qua non of the remedy of injunctive relief.86  For instance, the First Circuit 
                                                                                                                 
 78. See Oklahoma ex rel. Okla, Tax Comm’n, 455 F.3d at 1113. 
 79. Jackson Dairy, Inc., 596 F.2d at 72. 
 80. See WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 53, § 2948 (stating the four traditional 
factors as “(1) the significance of the threat of irreparable harm to plaintiff if the injunction 
is not granted; (2) the state of the balance between this harm and the injury that granting the 
injunction would inflict on defendant; (3) the probability that plaintiff will succeed on the 
merits; and (4) the public interest”). 
 81. See Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975) (stating that the two 
traditional factors are irreparable harm and likelihood of success on the merits). 
 82. See Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 345-46 
(4th Cir. 2009), partially vacated on other grounds, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010); Siegel v. 
Lepore, 234 F.3d 1163, 1176-77 (11th Cir. 2000) (stating that “even if [p]laintiffs establish a 
likelihood of success on the merits, the absence of irreparable injury would, standing alone, 
make preliminary injunctive relief improper.”). 
 83. Siegel, 234 F.3d at 1176. 
 84. Id. (quoting Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir. 1981)). 
 85. Texas V. Seatrain Int’l, 518 F.2d 175, 179 (5th Cir. 1975) (however, the court 
confusingly also endorses a sliding scale approach in the same decision). 
 86. See New Comm. Wireless Servs. v. Sprintcom, Inc., 287 F.3d 1, 8-9 (1st Cir. 2002); 
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Ass’n of Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 896 F.2d 
1283, 1285 (11th Cir. 1990).  
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stated, “if the moving party cannot demonstrate that he is likely to succeed 
in his quest, the remaining factors become matters of idle curiosity.”87   
D. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council 
In 2008, the Supreme Court clarified not only which factors should be 
used in determining whether a federal court should grant a preliminary 
injunction, but also how the factors should be applied.88  The Winter Court 
stated that, in order to be awarded a preliminary injunction, a movant “must 
establish that he is likely to succeed on the merits, that he is likely to suffer 
irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of 
equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest.”89  
Significantly, the Court spent relatively little time discussing the likelihood 
of success requirement and did not address whether it intended to prohibit 
the serious questions alternative to the likelihood of success requirement.90  
The Winter decision remains significant, however, because it may have 
direct implications for the future of the sliding scale approach.  While the 
Court never explicitly overruled the sliding scale, it declared the lower 
court’s grant of a preliminary injunction on a showing of “possible” 
irreparable harm inappropriate regardless of whether the movant had made 
a strong showing on the likelihood of success requirement.91  It appears, 
therefore, that Winter should be read to hold that a weak showing on 
irreparable harm cannot be balanced by the strength of other factors.92   
It may be argued that the Winter decision is a qualitative holding that 
should be read to negate the sliding scale approach only in situations where 
the strength of other factors are needed to compensate for the inability to 
show that irreparable harm is likely.  In other words, Winter may be read to 
negate the sliding scale approach when used to compensate for a weak 
showing of likelihood of success on the merits.93  However, the reasoning 
                                                                                                                 
 87. New Comm. Wireless Servs., 287 F.3d at 9 (citing Weaver v. Henderson, 984 F.2d 
11, 12 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
 88. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008). 
 89. Id. 
 90. See id.  It is curious that the Court did not include a serious questions alternative 
despite the fact that this case was appealed from the Ninth Circuit, a circuit that has 
employed the serious questions alternative in the past in its formulation of the factors for 
preliminary injunction. 
 91. See id. at 375-76. 
 92. See Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 345-
47(4th Cir. 2009), partially vacated on other grounds, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 93. See Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, No. 09-35756, 2011 WL 208360, at 
*4 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2011); Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities 
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in Winter could have serious implications for the circuits which utilize the 
serious questions standard.  The Winter Court held that allowing a 
diminished showing of irreparable harm would be “inconsistent with [the 
Court’s] characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy 
that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled 
to such relief.”94  As a result, the Court appears to have held that a light 
showing of one of the factors is insufficient not because of that particular 
factor’s relative importance95 but because the extraordinary nature of 
preliminary injunctions requires a movant to demonstrate clearly that all of 
the factors are in his favor.96  This interpretation of Winter would mean that 
the likelihood of success requirement must be established on its own and 
that a lesser showing of that requirement, such as serious questions as to the 
merits, is inappropriate regardless of the strength of the other factors.97  
This reasoning is consistent with previous Supreme Court discussions of the 
standard for preliminary injunctions.98  In Doran, for example, the Court 
held that the test for preliminary injunctions should be “stringently” 
applied.99  Likewise, in Grupo Mexican de Desarrollo, Justice Ginsburg 
specifically addressed the likelihood of success requirement, stating that 
“[p]laintiffs with questionable claims would not meet the likelihood of 
success criterion.”100  Justice Ginsburg continued, “as a general rule, [a] 
plaintiff seeking [a] preliminary injunction must demonstrate a reasonable 
probability of success.”101  Despite the language of Winter, circuits remain 
split as to whether Winter overrules the sliding scale approach to the 
granting of preliminary injunctions.102  Therefore, the question still remains 
                                                                                                                 
Master Fund Ltd., 598 F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 94. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374, 375-76. 
 95. There is a series of cases that hold that the irreparable harm factor is the sine qua 
non of the preliminary injunction test (e.g., Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 
1223, 1241 (11th Cir.2005)).  Therefore an argument can be made that the ruling in Winter 
could be attributed to the importance of the irreparable harm factor. 
 96. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 375-76. 
 97. See Real Truth About Obama, 575 F.3d at 345-47. 
 98. See Grupo Mexican de Desarrollo v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 340 
(1999); Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931-32 (1975).  
 99. Doran, 422 U.S. at 931-32. 
 100. Grupo Mexican de Desarrollo, 527 U.S. at 340 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part and 
concurring in part) (citing WRIGHT, MILLER & KANE, supra note 53, § 2948.3, at 184-88). 
 101. Id. (Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part) (citing WRIGHT, MILLER 
& KANE, supra note 53, § 2948.3, at 184-88). 
 102. Compare Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, No. 09-35756, 2011 WL 
208360, at *4-7 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2011) with Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election 
Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 345-47(4th Cir. 2009), partially vacated on other grounds, 607 F.3d 
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as to whether it is appropriate to utilize the serious questions alternative in 
determining whether to grant a motion for a preliminary injunction.  The 
Second Circuit considered this precise issue in Citigroup v. VCG Special 
Opportunities Master Fund Limited.103 
III. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc., v. VCG Special Opportunities Master 
Fund Limited 
A. Facts and Procedural History 
VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Limited (VCG), a hedge fund, 
and Citigroup Global Markets, Incorporated (CGMI) entered into an 
agreement in which CGMI would “provide prime brokerage services by 
clearing and settling trades in fixed income securities for VCG.”104  After 
this brokerage services agreement was consummated, VCG “entered into a 
credit default swap agreement with Citibank, N.A. (Citibank).”105  Because 
both were under the “corporate umbrella of Citigroup, Inc.,” Citibank was 
an affiliate of CGMI.106  Due to Citibank “declar[ing] a writedown of the 
assets covered in [the] credit swap[,]” VCG was obligated to pay Citibank 
$10,000,000.107  In response, VCG sued Citibank, claiming that declaring 
the writedown was a breach of the credit swap agreement.108  The district 
court ruled in favor of Citibank.109 
At the same time VCG sued Citibank, VCG also entered into an 
arbitration with CGMI in accordance with rules set out by the Financial 
Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA).110  FINRA “requires members . . . 
to arbitrate disputes . . . if arbitration is ‘requested by [a] customer,’ ‘[t]he 
dispute is between a customer and a member . . .’ and ‘[t]he dispute arises 
in connection with the business activities of the member.’”111  VCG 
claimed it was CGMI’s customer and therefore that CGMI was supposed to 
serve as a middleman between VCG and Citibank in the credit swap 
                                                                                                                 
355 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 103. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 
F.3d 30, 34 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 104. Id. at 32. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.  
 107. Id.  
 108. See id. 
 109. Id.  
 110. Id.  
 111. Id. (quoting FINRA Rule 12200). 
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agreement.112  CGMI claimed that VCG was not a customer of CGMI for 
purposes of the credit swap agreement, and thus that CGMI was not 
obligated to serve as a middleman between VCG and Citibank.113  
According to CGMI, since VCG was not a customer for purposes of the 
credit swap, it had no duty to enter into arbitration with VCG on the 
issue.114  Based on its arguments, CGMI filed suit in the “[federal] district 
court to permanently enjoin the arbitration.”115   
After filing suit, CGMI moved to obtain a preliminary injunction in order 
to enjoin arbitration until a final judgment was issued on its suit to enjoin 
the arbitration permanently.116  In response to the motion for a preliminary 
injunction, VCG argued that the credit swap agreement was recommended 
by CGMI and that terms for the agreement were accordingly set by 
CGMI.117  VCG further argued that CGMI representatives dealt with VCG 
with regards to the credit swap agreement.118  CGMI countered by stating 
that the representatives, while working in connection with the credit swap 
agreement, were acting as agents of Citibank, not CGMI.119  To bolster its 
claim, CGMI introduced evidence that VCG, in its initial disclosures, listed 
two of these representatives as being employed by Citibank, not CGMI.120 
The district court held that although CGMI had established that it was 
likely to suffer irreparable harm if an injunction was not issued, it failed to 
demonstrate a probability of success on the merits.121  Nevertheless, the 
district court granted the preliminary injunction and applied the serious 
questions test in lieu of the likelihood of success requirement.122  
Specifically, the district court ruled that whether VCG was a customer of 
CGMI for purposes of the credit swap agreement raised serious questions as 
to the merits of the case.123  In addition, the district court held that the 
balance of hardships tipped decidedly in CGMI’s favor.124  VCG filed a 
motion to reconsider the ruling on the grounds that Winter eliminated the 
                                                                                                                 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id.  
 114. Id. 
 115. Id.  
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 33. 
 118. Id.  
 119. Id.  
 120. Id.  
 121. Id.  
 122. Id.  
 123. Id. at 33-34. 
 124. Id. at 34. 
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serious questions alternative to the likelihood of success on the merits 
factor.125  The district court denied the motion and VCG appealed to the 
Second Circuit.126 
B. The Second Circuit’s Decision 
The Second Circuit focused its decision on whether “the district court 
abused its discretion by applying the wrong legal standard to CGMI’s 
request for preliminary injunction.”127  The court considered whether recent 
Supreme Court decisions, including Winter, “eliminated [the Second] 
[C]ircuit’s ‘serious question’ standard for the entry of a preliminary 
injunction.”128  The Second Circuit panel unanimously held that the 
Supreme Court did not overrule the circuit’s long-standing practice of 
utilizing the serious questions standard.129 
In determining that the serious questions alternative was still valid, the 
Citigroup court offered four justifications.130  First, the court stated that the 
serious questions alternative was justified on policy grounds.131  The court 
feared that the result of applying a strict requirement that a movant 
demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits would limit preliminary 
injunctions “to cases that are simple or easy.”132  The court noted the 
varying complexity of cases:  “[t]he value of this circuit’s approach to 
assessing the merits of a claim at the preliminary injunction stage lies in its 
flexibility in the face of varying factual scenarios and the greater 
uncertainties inherent at the outset of particularly complex litigation.”133  
The court inherently stated that a strict application of the likelihood of 
success requirement could rarely, if ever, be applied in a complex case 
because it would be impossible for a judge to determine if the movant is 
likely to succeed until the complexities have been fully litigated.134  The 
court did acknowledge the policy consideration that allowing a softer test in 
lieu of likelihood of success appears to lessen the burden on the movant in 
proving that an injunction should be awarded.135 However, the court 
                                                                                                                 
 125. Id.  
 126. Id.  
 127. Id.  
 128. Id.  
 129. Id. at 37. 
 130. Id. at 35-39. 
 131. Id. at 35-36. 
 132. Id. at 35. 
 133. Id.  
 134. See id. at 35-36. 
 135. Id. at 35. 
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clarified that in order to benefit from the softer serious questions standard, 
the movant must “establish that ‘the balance of hardships tips decidedly’ in 
its favor,”  thereby insisting that the burden on the movant is no lighter than 
it would be if he were required to establish likelihood of success on the 
merits.136 
Second, the Citigroup court cited specific Supreme Court cases in order 
to justify the serious questions alternative.137  The court began with Ohio 
Oil Co. v. Conway, a 1929 decision138 in which the Supreme Court 
confronted a factual dispute concerning a state tax on oil revenues.139  The 
Citigroup court cited the following language:  “[w]here the questions 
presented by an application for an interlocutory injunction are grave, and 
the injury to the moving party [in the absence of such an injunction] will be 
certain and irreparable . . . the injunction will usually be granted.”140  The 
Citigroup court also cited to Mazurek v. Armstrong, claiming that the 
Mazurek Court recognized a “fair chance” standard for proving likelihood 
of success.141 
Third, the Citigroup court narrowly construed Winter and other recent 
Supreme Court decisions instructing that a movant must demonstrate 
likelihood of success on the merits in order to receive a preliminary 
injunction.142  The court noted the absence in recent cases of commentary 
on the serious questions alternative.143  The court distinguished Winter by 
stating that it was decided on the issue of the balance of the equities and 
public interest and therefore that it “expressly withheld any consideration of 
the merits of the parties’ underlying claims.”144  Because the Winter Court 
did not determine whether the movant had demonstrated a likelihood of 
success, the Citigroup court held that Winter should have no effect on the 
serious questions alternative.145  Citigroup distinguished another recent 
Supreme Court decision, Munaf v. Geren, in which the Court held that it 
was improper to issue a preliminary injunction because of serious 
jurisdictional questions without considering the actual merits of the case.  
                                                                                                                 
 136. Id.  
 137. See id. at 36-37. 
 138. Ohio Oil Co. v. Conway, 279 U.S. 813 (1929). 
 139. Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 36-37 (citing Ohio Oil, 279 U.S. at 814). 
 140. Id. (quoting Ohio Oil, 279 U.S. at 814). 
 141. Id. (citing Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 975-76 (1997)). 
 142. See id. at 37. 
 143. Id. 
 144. See id. (citing Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 375-
76, 381 (2008)). 
 145. See id.  
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The Second Circuit concluded that Munaf had no application to the serious 
questions standard because serious jurisdictional questions and serious 
questions as to the merits are different issues.146 
Finally, the Citigroup court set out what is probably its most telling 
justification for adhering to the serious questions alternative in spite of 
recent Supreme Court decisions.  It stated that despite all arguments that the 
Supreme Court has implicitly done away with the alternative, it has yet to 
explicitly do so.147  The court pointed out that the Second Circuit 
“recognized this flexible standard since at least 1953.”148  The court argued 
that not only does the long history of the standard justify its continued use, 
but the fact it has yet to be overturned in over five decades speaks to its 
credence.149  In the Second Circuit’s view, “[i]f the Supreme Court had 
meant . . . to abrogate the more flexible standard for a preliminary 
injunction” and thus eliminate over five decades of Second Circuit 
jurisprudence it would have explicitly done so.150 
IV. Analysis 
A. Citigroup Ignores the Language of Winter 
Citigroup held that the serious questions alternative to likelihood of 
success on the merits is not inconsistent with Winter and thus remains 
valid.151  The Second Circuit justified its narrow reading of the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Winter because the Supreme Court refrained from 
considering the merits of the parties’ claims and never even mentioned the 
serious question alternative.152  Essentially, the Citigroup court argued that 
because the letter of the law handed down in Winter fails expressly to 
negate the serious questions alternative, the Winter decision is irrelevant to 
the issue of the validity of that alternative.153  Citigroup is correct that 
Winter did not expressly address the serious questions alternative.  
However, by failing to give due consideration to the language used by the 
Supreme Court, the Second Circuit improperly narrowed the standard set 
forth in Winter and allowed for constructive elimination of a requirement 
                                                                                                                 
 146. See id.  
 147. See id. at 38. 
 148. See id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. See id. 
 151. Id. at 35-38. 
 152. See id. at 37. 
 153. See id. 
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dictated by the Supreme Court.  If the serious questions alternative 
contradicts the Supreme Court’s standard in Winter, then Winter should be 
read as a de facto overruling of the serious questions alternative. 
1. Citigroup Improperly Weakens the Winter Standard For Preliminary 
Injunctions 
When setting forth the requirements for the granting of a preliminary 
injunction, the Winter Court clearly and unmistakably used mandatory 
language.154  The Court stated, among other things:  “[a] plaintiff seeking a 
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the 
merits. . . .”155  This idea did not originate with Winter.  Rather, the concept 
can be traced back to Doran v. Salem Inn Inc., in which the Supreme Court 
stated that a traditional requirement for granting a preliminary injunction is 
that the movant demonstrate “that he is likely to prevail on the merits.”156  
After Doran, the Supreme Court again acknowledged the “well-established 
principle that the party seeking [a preliminary injunction] bears the burden 
of demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits.”157  The Supreme 
Court has also held that the standard for a preliminary injunction is 
“stringent”.158  Thus, in the context of preliminary injunctions, the use of 
the word “must” should not be read lightly. 
Despite the well-established principle that the movant demonstrate a 
likelihood of success on the merits and the use of the word “must” in 
Winter, Citigroup holds that a movant may be granted a preliminary 
injunction by demonstrating something less than a likelihood of success.159  
By ignoring the strict, mandatory language of the Supreme Court, Citigroup 
weakens the Winter standard and essentially transforms the Court’s 
language from mandatory to precatory.160  Under the serious questions 
alternative, as articulated in Citigroup, a movant is not required to 
demonstrate likelihood of success in order to enjoin another party from 
engaging in a specific action. Rather, demonstrating likelihood of success 
proves to be merely an option that a party may or may not utilize on its path 
                                                                                                                 
 154. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008).   
 155. Id. (emphasis added) 
 156. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 931 (1975). 
 157. Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 428 
(2006). 
 158. See Doran, 422 U.S. at 931-32. 
 159. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 
F.3d 30, 35 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 160. See id. 
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to receiving an order for preliminary injunction.161  Citigroup allows this 
result despite the fact that there is no indication that the Supreme Court 
intended the word “must” to mean anything less than a mandate.162  On the 
contrary, it is arguable that the inclusion of a specific, mandatory 
requirement overrules or excludes the use of other requirements that would 
alter, narrow, or weaken that specific requirement.163  As a result, the nature 
of the serious questions alternative clearly violates and weakens the 
mandatory nature of Winter’s standard. 
Citigroup attempts to negate criticism that its holding weakens Winter by 
stating that, in order to utilize the serious questions alternative, the movant 
must also demonstrate “that the balance of hardships tips decidedly in her 
favor.”164  According to the Second Circuit, since the Winter standard 
requires only a showing of the balance of hardships tipping in the movant’s 
favor, the Citigroup standard remains as strict as the Winter standard.165  
Citigroup fails to acknowledge that the serious questions alternative is more 
flexible for the movant, because it allows the movant two paths to securing 
a preliminary injunction whereas the Winter standard allows only one.  In 
Citigroup, the Second Circuit noted the district court’s initial consideration 
of whether CGMI had established a probability of success on the merits. 166  
After ruling that CGMI was unable to establish such a probability, the 
district court considered whether the serious questions standard saved 
CGMI’s motion for preliminary injunction.167  This is significant because it 
demonstrates that, in the Second Circuit at least, a movant does not have to 
choose between the likelihood of success path or the serious questions path 
at the beginning of the proceeding and stay on that path until the end.  
Rather, a petitioner can start out by arguing likelihood of success and use 
the serious questions path as a safety net should the likelihood of success 
argument fail.  As a result, the serious questions alternative is much broader 
than the Winter standard.  Under the strict language of Winter, CGMI’s 
                                                                                                                 
 161. See id. 
 162. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374-76 (2008). 
 163. See Real Truth About Obama, Inc. v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 575 F.3d 342, 345-47 
(4th Cir. 2009) (holding that Winter overrules the use of a balancing approach because the 
strict language in Winter negates the use of the lighter serious questions standard), partially 
vacated on other grounds, 607 F.3d 355 (4th Cir. 2010). 
 164. Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 35 (quoting Jackson Dairy, Inc. v. H.P. Hood & Sons Inc., 
596 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1979)). 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. at 33. 
 167. Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., No. 
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motion for preliminary injunction should have been denied after likelihood 
of success could not be established. Winter’s mandatory language allows 
only one path to being awarded a preliminary injunction—by 
demonstrating, among other things, a likelihood of success on the merits.168  
CGMI’s motion was not denied, however, because under the Second 
Circuit’s standard, an alternative existed:  CGMI could take the serious 
questions path to a preliminary injunction.169  The second path was 
available to CGMI only because the Second Circuit inaccurately read the 
language in Winter as optional, not mandatory.  If the likelihood of success 
route was truly treated as mandatory, no other option should have been 
available.  If the Supreme Court had intended to allow the weakening of its 
standard, one would expect it either to mention such intention or to refrain 
from using language suggesting that a party must establish likelihood of 
success on the merits.  As a result, even though Winter does not speak 
directly to the serious questions alternative, the strict, mandatory language 
used by the Court should be read as a de facto rejection of that alternative.   
It can be argued, and in fact is argued by the Second Circuit, that the 
Winter Court did not intend to invalidate the serious questions alternative 
by excluding it from the standard it set forth because the serious questions 
alternative was not at issue in the that case.170  This is a valid argument that 
is probably the primary reason why some circuits continue to use the 
serious questions alternative.171  Significantly, the Winter case arrived at the 
Supreme Court out of the Ninth Circuit.172  The Ninth Circuit continuously 
propounds a serious questions alternative in its articulation of the standard 
for preliminary injunctions.173  Moreover, in the Ninth Circuit’s opinion in 
Winter, the court included the serious questions alternative in its statement 
of the requirements for preliminary injunction.174  Accordingly, the 
Supreme Court was aware of the Ninth Circuit’s use of the serious 
questions alternative. Despite this fact the Winter Court created no 
exception to the requirement that a party must show a likelihood of success 
                                                                                                                 
 168. See Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 374 (2008). 
 169. See Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 33-34. 
 170. Id. at 37. 
 171. See id.; Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell, No. 09-35756, 2011 WL 208360, 
at *4-7 (9th Cir. Jan. 25, 2011). 
 172. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374. 
 173. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Winter, 518 F.3d 658, 677 (9th Cir. 
2008); Dollar Rent a Car of Wash., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 774 F.2d 1371, 1374-75 
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 174. Winter, 518 F.3d at 677. 
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in order to be awarded a preliminary injunction.175  Citigroup, however, 
reasons that because the Winter Court withheld any discussion on 
likelihood of success, then Winter is irrelevant to the validity of the serious 
questions alternative.176  Actually, the Winter Court withheld a discussion 
of whether the movant in that case had demonstrated a likelihood of 
success.177  The Court chose not to discuss whether the movant had 
demonstrated this requirement because it had already determined, based on 
other grounds, that the lower court’s granting of a preliminary injunction 
was erroneous.178  Failure to determine specifically whether the movant had 
demonstrated a likelihood of success fails to render Winter irrelevant to the 
serious questions alternative.  Winter expressly stated that demonstrating a 
likelihood of success is a requirement that a movant must meet in order to 
be awarded a preliminary injunction.179  Furthermore, the Winter Court did 
not state that a plaintiff must establish likelihood of success only in the 
context of the case at hand, but simply affirmed that a requirement in 
preliminary injunction cases in general is that the party seeking the 
injunction must establish that it is likely to succeed on the merits.180  This 
arguably supports the Court’s intention to establish a uniform standard for 
preliminary injunctions.  If that were the intent of the Court, the expression 
of the requirements in Winter should be read to negate all substitutes for 
demonstrating likelihood of success as well as any language weakening 
those requirements. 
2. Citigroup Not Only Softens Winter, It Constructively Eliminates a 
Requirement Dictated By the Supreme Court 
Citigroup states that the Supreme Court has not issued a decision that 
negatively affects the serious questions standard,181 yet every time a court 
applies that standard it not only weakens the language used in Winter but 
also eliminates a requirement that the Supreme Court has continually 
mandated must be established.182  In Munaf v. Geren, the Supreme Court 
emphasized the extraordinary nature of preliminary relief:  “a party seeking 
                                                                                                                 
 175. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374. 
 176. Citigroup Global Mkts, Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 598 
F.3d 30, 37 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 177. Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 381. 
 178. Id. 
 179. See id. at 374. 
 180. See id. 
 181. Citigroup, 598 F.3d at 37-38. 
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922, 931 (1975).   
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
458 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:437 
 
 
a preliminary injunction must demonstrate, among other things ‘a 
likelihood of success on the merits.’”183 
In Munaf, the Supreme Court considered whether “United States district 
courts may exercise their habeas jurisdiction to enjoin” the United States 
military from handing over individuals detained in another country to that 
country’s government for criminal prosecution.184  The district court 
enjoined the military from doing so, and the D.C. Circuit affirmed, stating 
that the issue of whether the court had jurisdiction “presented questions so 
serious, substantial, difficult and doubtful, as to make them fair ground for 
litigation and thus for more deliberative investigation.”185  Accordingly, the 
D.C. Circuit never concluded that the movant demonstrated a likelihood of 
success.  Ultimately, the Supreme Court held that the district court abused 
its discretion because it issued an injunction based on “the view that the 
‘jurisdictional issues’ . . . were tough, without even considering the merits 
of the underlying habeas petition.”186  The Court stressed that “one searches 
the opinions below in vain for any mention of a likelihood of success as to 
the merits. . . .”187 
Citigroup disregarded Munaf and claimed that “[t]he Supreme Court 
vacated that injunction on the grounds that a ‘likelihood of jurisdiction’ was 
irrelevant to the preliminary injunction consideration and could not 
substitute for a consideration of the merits.”188  This analysis is a 
misinterpretation of Munaf.  In actuality, the Munaf Court did not vacate the 
injunction because of the irrelevance of the likelihood of jurisdiction issue. 
Instead, the Court vacated the preliminary injunction because the lower 
court failed to take any consideration of the movant’s likelihood of success 
on the merits.189  The decision turned on the fact that the lower court 
inappropriately substituted one issue, likelihood of jurisdiction, for the 
requirement that the movant demonstrate that he was likely to succeed on 
the merits.190 
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The Citigroup court made the very same mistake.191  The Second 
Circuit’s test for a preliminary injunction, as articulated in Citigroup, 
allows for an injunction to be granted if the movant can show, among other 
things, “either (1) likelihood of success on the merits or (2) sufficiently 
serious questions going to the merits to make them a fair ground for 
litigation and a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party 
requesting the preliminary relief.”192  The test is either/or, meaning that if a 
party shows serious questions as to the merits coupled with the hardships 
tipping decidedly in its favor it can treat that as a substitution for the 
likelihood of success requirement.193  Consideration of the seriousness of 
the questions going to the merits of a case is not synonymous with 
consideration of the likelihood of success on the merits themselves.  A 
party may be able to show that the merits of a particular case are complex 
and the factual record incomplete but that is a far cry from demonstrating 
that the party has a strong enough case, at the time the motion for 
preliminary injunction is made, to demonstrate that the party’s claim is 
likely to succeed at trial.194  Consequently, like the lower court in Munaf, 
Citigroup inappropriately allows a substitution for the likelihood of success 
requirement.  According to the Supreme Court’s decision in Munaf, the 
serious questions alternative should be viewed as an abuse of discretion 
because it allows a preliminary injunction to be issued without the court 
ever considering whether the movant is likely to succeed on the merits. 
The Citigroup court also minimized the Munaf decision by reasoning 
that the Supreme Court did not define “likelihood of success” in its 
holding.195  Therefore, according to the Second Circuit, likelihood of 
success does not necessarily have to mean that a claim is more likely than 
not to succeed.196  Although the Supreme Court did not define likelihood of 
success, it did maintain that a movant must demonstrate that he is likely to 
succeed.197  Not only does the Second Circuit’s version of the standard for a 
preliminary injunction give district courts the discretion to define likelihood 
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of success, it also grants courts wide discretion to completely remove the 
requirement from the equation.198  Even though it does not explicitly say so, 
the Second Circuit gives its district courts the power to overrule the 
Supreme Court’s mandate that a party seeking a preliminary injunction 
must demonstrate likelihood of success on the merits. 
Citigroup does attempt to justify the serious questions alternative and its 
corresponding elimination of a requirement dictated by the Supreme Court.  
The Second Circuit reasoned that since the movant must demonstrate that 
the balance of hardships tips decidedly in his favor, the movant’s burden is 
equal to the burden of establishing likelihood of success.199  Citigroup’s 
rationale depends on the validity of the idea that removing one factor and 
replacing it with an increased burden as to another factor results in an 
overall equal burden on the moving party.200  Yet the facts of Citigroup 
itself contradict this argument.  In Citigroup, in order for CGMI to prove 
that it was likely to succeed, it would have had to show that some of its 
employees who worked on the credit swap were, at the time of the swap, 
acting as representatives of Citibank, which was an affiliate of CGMI, not 
CGMI itself.201  Not only was the fact pattern of Citigroup complex, but 
according to the Second Circuit, the issue of whether VCG was a customer 
of CGMI was in sharp dispute due to contradictions in the record.202  
Obviously, proving likelihood of success was extremely difficult in this 
scenario.  In fact, the district court found that CGMI could not prove that it 
was likely to succeed.203  In contrast, all CGMI had to do in order to prove 
that the balance of hardships tipped decidedly in its favor was to show that 
“an injunction would simply freeze the arbitration without destroying 
VCG’s ability to continue that arbitration” should CGMI lose its suit for a 
permanent injunction.204  Proving probable success on a complicated fact 
pattern that is in sharp dispute should not be considered an equal burden to 
the burden of showing that the party opposing a preliminary injunction of 
arbitration can simply continue that arbitration should it eventually win the 
injunction case.  In fact patterns like Citigroup at least, proving that the 
balance of hardships tips decidedly in one’s favor is much easier than 
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proving probability of success on the merits.  Therefore, the reality is that 
eliminating or weakening one requirement and increasing the burden as to 
another does not always equal the burden of having to establish all of the 
original requirements. 
B. Citigroup Ignores the Reasoning Used by the Supreme Court in Winter 
Winter should be interpreted to eliminate the serious questions standard 
as a substitute for demonstrating likelihood of success on the merits.205  
Noting the Court’s “frequently reiterated standard [that] requires plaintiffs 
seeking preliminary relief to demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in 
the absence of injunction,” the Winter Court held that demonstrating a mere 
possibility of irreparable harm was “too lenient”  to justify granting a 
preliminary injunction.206  To prove that its standard was “frequently 
reiterated,” Winter cited Los Angeles v. Lyons, in which the Supreme Court 
held that an injunction was inappropriate “absent a showing of irreparable 
injury. . . .”207  The importance of Winter’s discussion as to the appropriate 
standard for demonstrating irreparable harm lies in its emphasis on the 
word “likely.”208  The Court held that likely meant something stronger than 
the possibility of injury.209  The Court reached this conclusion not because 
the irreparable injury factor is more important than the other factors but 
because of the extraordinary nature of the remedy.210  Other Supreme Court 
precedent has similarly emphasized the extraordinary nature of preliminary 
injunctions.  As a result, parties have no absolute right to such relief.211  The 
Winter Court highlighted the extraordinary nature of preliminary relief as 
the reason why a strong demonstration of a likelihood of success is not 
enough to balance out the inability to establish that irreparable harm is 
likely.212  For practical purposes, this reasoning eliminated the use of a 
sliding scale to balance out a weak showing on irreparable harm, but not 
because of the importance of that specific factor.  Rather, the basis for the 
Court’s reasoning was the overall drastic nature of the relief. 
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In light of Winter’s rationale, it would seem appropriate to revert back to 
the Court’s “frequently reiterated standard” to determine the appropriate 
burden for demonstrating a likelihood of success on the merits.  When 
stating the test for a preliminary injunction, the Supreme Court has 
continually emphasized that the movant must demonstrate that he is likely 
to succeed on the merits.213  In Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo v. Alliance 
Bond Fund, Inc., Justice Ginsburg acknowledged that a plaintiff seeking 
preliminary relief must demonstrate both a likelihood of success and that 
“[p]laintiffs with questionable claims would not meet the likelihood of 
success criterion.”214  Furthermore, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it 
is a “well established principle” that a movant seeking a preliminary 
injunction must demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.215  It is 
true, as Citigroup points out, that the Supreme Court in Ohio Oil Co. v. 
Conway issued a favorable ruling vis-à-vis the serious questions 
standard.216  It should be noted, however, that Ohio Oil Co. was decided in 
1929, before the Court laid out the traditional factors in Doran,217 before 
demonstrating a likelihood of success was acknowledged as a “well 
established principle” as it was in Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita 
Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal,218 and before Winter stated that likelihood of 
success must be established.219  Whatever the test in 1929, it appears 
evident that, in the eight decades since Ohio Oil Co. was decided, the 
Supreme Court has frequently reaffirmed that a movant seeking a 
preliminary injunction must demonstrate a likelihood of success.220   
Applying these precedents, the Winter Court stated, “a plaintiff seeking 
preliminary injunction must establish that he is likely to succeed on the 
merits, [and] that he is likely to suffer irreparable harm.”221  Given the 
frequently reiterated standard for demonstrating likelihood of success 
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coupled with Winter’s own discussion of the term “likely,” it makes no 
sense to suggest that the Winter Court intended the first “likely” to have a 
less stringent application than the second “likely.”  The Court clearly 
intended the requirement that a movant demonstrate that he is “likely” to 
suffer irreparable harm to mean more than a mere possibility of irreparable 
harm balanced out by the strength of another factor.  It follows that 
requiring a movant to show that he is “likely” to succeed on the merits also 
means that he must demonstrate more than serious questions as to the 
merits coupled with the balance of hardships tipping decidedly in the 
movant’s favor. 
Significantly, Winter cited Mazurek v. Armstrong and stated that 
awarding a preliminary injunction despite the movant’s failure to establish 
one of the requirements “is inconstant with [the Supreme Court’s] 
characterization of injunctive relief as an extraordinary remedy that may 
only be awarded upon a clear showing that the plaintiff is entitled to such 
relief.”222  In Mazurek, the Court considered a challenge to a Montana law 
prohibiting all but licensed physicians from performing abortions.223  The 
main issue before Mazurek Court was whether the petitioners, who were 
seeking to enjoin Montana from enforcing the law, had adequately 
demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits.224  In determining that 
the petitioners had not made an adequate showing of likelihood of success, 
the Court stated that the burden of proof that an injunction is proper is 
“much higher” than the proof necessary for a summary judgment.225  As a 
result, the Court overruled the Ninth Circuit’s grant of an injunction.  
According to Mazurek, the drastic and extraordinary nature of relief dictates 
that an injunction should be granted only upon a clear showing that the 
movant has carried the burden of persuasion concerning likelihood of 
success.226  Mazurek’s requirement that likelihood of success be clearly 
shown in order for preliminary relief to be granted supplements Winter’s 
requirement that irreparable harm must be demonstrated on its own clear 
showing regardless of the strength of another factor.  Winter’s citation of 
Mazurek to justify its holding should be read to support the conclusion that 
each of the Winter factors must be clearly shown on its own and that the 
strength of one factor cannot balance out the weakness of another. 
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In contrast, the serious questions standard allows a plaintiff to be granted 
a preliminary injunction without demonstrating a likelihood of success.227  
This can only be reconciled with the Supreme Court’s continued 
requirement that a plaintiff must demonstrate a likelihood of success if a 
stronger showing of other factors coupled with a serious question on the 
merits does in fact demonstrate likelihood of success.  But such an 
argument goes directly against the reasoning of Winter.  Some may argue 
that the reasoning in Winter should apply only to the irreparable harm 
requirement because of the importance of that factor.228  However, that idea 
is found nowhere in Winter. Indeed, the Court explicitly stated that its 
decision was based on the extraordinary nature of injunctive relief as a 
whole.  The Court did not even remotely suggest that the importance of the 
irreparable harm factor influenced its decision.229  Therefore, it simply does 
not follow that the Supreme Court would agree that the extraordinariness of 
preliminary injunctions prohibits a sliding scale to be applied to irreparable 
harm but allows one to be applied to the other factors.  The reasoning in 
Winter should be read to invalidate the serious questions alternative because 
that alternative allows a lack of demonstrating one factor, likelihood of 
success, to be balanced out by the heightened strength of another factor. 
C. The Serious Questions Alternative Eliminates an Important Protection 
for Parties Opposing Preliminary Injunction and Turns an Extraordinary 
Remedy into an Ordinary One 
Requiring a party to prove likelihood of success on the merits erects an 
important protection for those defending against preliminary injunctions.230  
A preliminary injunction prevents a party from taking specific action prior 
to a case being decided.231  In other words, a preliminary injunction gives 
one party the same relief before a trial that it would receive after a complete 
trial, albeit on a temporary basis.232  Because preliminary injunctions grant 
relief prior to a full hearing on the merits, an injunction is considered 
harsh.233  Citigroup itself stated that “[t]he very purpose of an injunction . . . 
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is to give temporary relief based on a preliminary estimate of the strength of 
a plaintiff’s suit, prior to the resolution at trial of the factual disputes and 
difficulties presented by the case.”234  The likelihood of success 
requirement serves as protection to an opposing party.  The requirement 
prevents an opposing party from having to endure temporary defeat despite 
the fact that the movant has little to no chance of winning at trial.235  
Therefore, a preliminary injunction should be inappropriate “[n]o matter 
how severe and irreparable an injury one seeking [the] preliminary 
injunction may suffer in its absence . . . if there is no chance that the 
movant will eventually prevail on the merits.”236  Serious questions on the 
merits, coupled with a showing that the balance of hardships tips decidedly 
in the movant’s favor, estimates the level of harm the movant may suffer 
but not the strength of the suit overall.  The balance of hardships is 
irrelevant to the likelihood of success requirement.  If the movant cannot 
demonstrate he is likely to succeed on the merits, he should not be allowed 
to prevent another party from exercising its right to act.237  Although it may 
seem strict to prohibit a party who is under threat of irreparable harm to 
enjoin another from causing that harm prior to the outcome of a case solely 
because the movant cannot establish likelihood of success, preliminary 
relief is a drastic remedy and, as such, “is the exception rather than the 
rule.”238   
Citigroup states that the rationale behind the serious questions 
alternative, and consequently the removal of the protection that the 
likelihood of success requirement erects, is that limiting preliminary 
injunctions to cases in which the movant can demonstrate a likelihood of 
success would confine the relief “to cases that are simple or easy.”239  This 
rationale erroneously assumes that preliminary injunctions should be 
available in all types of cases.  In fact, preliminary injunctions should 
instead be awarded only in extraordinary cases.240  Furthermore, just 
because a case is complex does not necessarily mean that a party cannot 
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demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits.241  A movant, in order to 
satisfy the likelihood of success requirement, “is not required to prove to a 
moral certainty that his is the only correct position.”242  Likelihood of 
success simply requires a determination of the probable outcome at the time 
the request for preliminary injunction is made.243  It does not require the 
court to determine who will ultimately win once the case has been 
presented in full.244  In the Second Circuit, however, even if a party is 
unable to prove likelihood of success due to the complexities of the case, 
that party must be given the same chance to obtain preliminary relief as 
parties with simpler cases.  This flies directly in the face of the constant 
affirmation of the Supreme Court that the granting of a preliminary 
injunction is not a matter of right.245  It may be true that it is an 
extraordinary case in which, in the face of complex or incomplete facts, the 
movant can demonstrate at the time a preliminary injunction is sought that 
he is likely to succeed.  Yet this only proves the point that preliminary 
injunctions are only to be granted in extraordinary cases. 
Because of the danger of making requirements for a preliminary 
injunction so inflexible that it becomes unavailable as a remedy, 
Citigroup’s policy consideration for utilizing the serious questions 
alternative should be given proper regard.  In fact, equitable relief 
originated because of the rigid nature of the English writ system.  Due to 
inflexibility, injustices lacked remedy.246  The Second Circuit’s policy 
consideration, however, must be balanced against the extraordinary nature 
of preliminary injunctions.  A preliminary injunction gives the court power 
to compel action of a party, despite the fact that there is “[a] possibility that 
preliminary relief will prove to be erroneous when a full trial on the merits 
is held.”247  The extraordinary nature of this relief is evident:  “[n]early 
every judicial opinion addressing a request for preliminary injunctive relief 
recognizes the historical principle that such relief is a drastic remedy to be 
granted sparingly. . . .”248  A recent study of relevant case law, however, 
revealed that between 2003 and 2006 forty-percent of motions for 
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preliminary injunction were granted in federal district courts.249  Clearly, a 
once extraordinary remedy is on its way to becoming ordinary in our legal 
system.250  If Citigroup’s reasoning that preliminary injunctions should be 
available in all types of cases, not just extraordinary ones, is followed, the 
granting of preliminary injunctions will continue its path towards normalcy.  
Winter acknowledged that its reason for narrowing the standard for 
preliminary injunction was to uphold the belief that such relief is “an 
extraordinary remedy that may only be awarded upon a clear showing that 
the plaintiff is entitled to [it].”251  Thus, even if the Second Circuit’s policy 
consideration is valid, Winter indicates that the current Supreme Court may 
be inclined to sacrifice availability of preliminary injunctions to parties with 
complex cases in order to protect the remedy’s extraordinary status.  
Requiring a party to demonstrate likelihood of success, while possibly 
making it harder for parties with complex cases to obtain a preliminary 
injunction, serves to protect the extraordinary nature of this harsh remedy.   
V. Conclusion 
In Citigroup, the Second Circuit sidestepped Supreme Court precedent in 
an effort to sustain five decades of its own jurisprudence.252  The strongest 
argument Citigroup makes to justify its avoidance of that precedent is that 
the Supreme Court never explicitly stated that it was overruling the serious 
questions alternative.253  A closer look at Winter, however, reveals that the 
Court explicitly used mandatory, strict language to set forth the requirement 
that a party seeking a preliminary injunction must establish likelihood of 
success.254  Winter’s mandatory language should be interpreted as 
overruling the serious questions alternative, despite the fact that the Court 
never expressly addressed that alternative, because a lesser standard 
transforms the Court’s language from mandatory to optional.  Moreover, 
the reasoning used by the Court can be read to require that all the Winter 
factors for a preliminary injunction be clearly established without the 
strength of one factor compensating for the weakness of another.255  The 
                                                                                                                 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. 
 251. Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 129 S. Ct. 365, 375-76 (2008). 
 252. See Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. VCG Special Opportunities Master Fund Ltd., 
598 F.3d 30, 35, 38 (2d Cir. 2010). 
 253. See id. at 38. 
 254. See Winter, 129 S. Ct. at 374. 
 255. See id. at 374-76. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
468 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:437 
 
 
only way Citigroup can stand is if this aspect of Winter is completely 
disregarded. 
Because the English Court of Chancery failed to implement concrete 
legal principles to govern awarding of relief, some of this nation’s founding 
fathers feared arbitrary rulings concerning equitable remedies.256  For too 
long the federal circuit courts have been in disagreement over the 
appropriate standards and requirements for determining whether a 
preliminary injunction is appropriate in a particular case.257  The Supreme 
Court, in Winter, took a monumental step forward in establishing a uniform, 
concrete test for the granting of preliminary injunctions.  However, in an 
effort to sustain decades’ worth of Second Circuit jurisprudence, the 
Citigroup court improperly narrowed Winter and other Supreme Court 
precedent.258  If a court can take requirements dictated by years of Supreme 
Court precedent and eliminate or replace those requirements at its 
convenience, arbitrary rule is the result.  If each federal court is allowed to 
disregard Supreme Court reasoning and language when it comes to 
preliminary injunctions, then valuable safeguards for defendants will be 
abandoned.  Allowing the requirements for preliminary injunctions to be 
changed or weakened, depending on the complexity of the case at hand, is 
one step closer to the preliminary injunction becoming the rule rather than 
the exception.  Allowing preliminary injunctions to be issued absent a 
showing that the movant is likely to succeed on the merits is similarly one 
step closer to turning an extraordinary remedy into an ordinary one. 
 
Jacob S. Crawford  
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